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Recent Decisions
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-STANDING

AND

APPEALABILITY-The

Pennsyl-

vania Supreme Court held that an unsuccessful applicant for one of
four horse racing licenses which the State Horse Racing Commission
was authorized to grant had standing to bring an appeal after the
granting of all four authorized licenses by the Commission, and that no
abuse of discretion was shown in granting the licenses to the particular

licensees.
Man 0' War Racing Association v. State Horse Racing Commission,
433 Pa. 432, 250 A.2d 172 (1969).
The Pennsylvania Legislature enacted Act No. 3311 to enable the
commencement of thoroughbred horse racing with pari-mutuel betting
in the State of Pennsylvania. The Act provided for the issuance of four
licenses to be granted for a one year period for use up to one hundred
days per year. These licenses were to be granted by an independent
State Horse Racing Commission to be established by the Act. Appellant
Man 0' War was one of fifteen applicants for the four licenses and here

brings suit against the individual members of the Commission challenging its decision-making process in granting the four licenses to applicants other than Man 0' War and the constitutionality of the Horse
Racing act itself. Appellant joins in the suit the four applicants receiving licenses: The Continental Thoroughbred Racing Association,

Inc., Eagle Downs Race Track, Inc., Pennsylvania National Turf Club,
Inc., and the Shamrock Racing Association, Inc. Although Appellant
filed with the Commission for a Section 20 appeal2 to the Commission,
the instant appeal came before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
directly from the Commission's original decision by writ of certiorari.

The Court held: 1. that Appellant had a case in which an appeal in the
nature of broad certiorari would lie; 2. that Appellant individually
had standing to bring the case before the Court; 3. that Appellant had
I. PA.
2. PA.
a license
days . . .

STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2651-75 (1968).
STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2670 (1968): "If the . . . Commission shall refuse to grant
applied for under this act, . . . the applicant . . . may demand, within ten
, a hearing before the Commission. ....
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waived his procedural due process rights at the administrative level;
and 4. that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in granting the
four licenses.
I.

SCOPE OF APPEALABILITY

Before tackling the bigger issue of whether an appeal should lie in
the nature of certiorari, the Court disposed of the question of which
type of certiorari would apply, should it later be decided that an appeal
lay in the nature of certiorari. In the historical development of certiorari, the scope of the appeals based on certiorari varied from broad to
narrow certiorari. Broad certiorari indicated the scope of review used
in appeals from inferior court decisions based on the application of a
statute that was silent regarding appeals. Narrow certiorari became the
scope of review from these same inferior courts, but in decisions based
on legislation specifically stating that no appeal shall lie. The concept of
certiorari is deeply rooted in common law.8 It is based on the belief
that lower tribunals should be subject to appellate review of their
application of justice, regardless of what legislation says to the contrary. 4
The idea behind broad certiorari is that since the legislature has
omitted any mention of appeal, the appellate court should therefore
have the right to a broad review of the lower tribunal's decision. Broad
certiorari, under Pennsylvania law, allows the Supreme Court to consider the record of the proceedings from the lower tribunal, including
the testimony, to determine whether the findings were supported by
competent evidence and whether any conclusions of law were erroneously made.5 Where the scope of review is narrow certiorari, the
rationale in Pennsylvania is that the courts will give credence to the
legislature's power to limit appeal. As a result, the appeal is limited to
the question of whether the lower tribunal had proper jurisdiction over
the case involved.6
3. For an excellent discussion of the development and present status of certiorari,
broad and narrow; See Reader, Judicial-Review of "Final" Administrative Decisions in

Pennsylvania, 67 DIcK. L. REv. 1, 8 (1962).
4. See, Rimer's Contested Election, 316 Pa. 342, 175 A. 544 (1934).
5. Delaware County National Bank v. Campbell, 378 Pa. at 317-318, 106 A.2d at 419
(1954), Keystone Raceway Association v. State Harness Racing Commission, 405 Pa. at 6,
173 A.2d at 99 (1961), Ritter Finance Co. of Levittown v. Myers, 401 Pa. 467, 165 A.2d
246 (1960).
6. Id.
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Based on this law, the Court in this case disposed of the issue of broad
versus narrow certiorari on the ground that since Act No. 331 was
silent with regard to whether the Horse Racing Commission's decisions
were "final" or "conclusive" or whether an appeal is prohibited, an
appeal, if granted by writ of certiorari, should be in the nature of
7
broad certiorari.
II.

APPEALABILITY BY CERTIORARI

At this point, Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, discussed
the more difficult question of whether or not the instant case was one
where an appeal through certiorari should lie. The discussion was
begun by the statement, based on Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State
Harness Racing Commission," that for an appeal in certiorari to lie,
the order or decision of the Horse Racing Commission must be "judicial
in nature." 9 In the development of certiorari from common law and
into today's law, it has been felt that review by appellate courts by
certiorari should lie such that it would not infringe upon legislative
bodies. Therefore, the review of lower courts' or administrative
bodies' decisions was limited to those which called for more than the
mere enforcement of statutory law; specifically those decisions calling
for the tribunal's judgment and the application of common law considerations in interpretation and reaching the decision; a decision-making
7. The Court here seems to have gone on the assumption that technically Man 0'
War is appealing from a grant of licenses to four other applicants; not from the
refusal of a license to them. Following this assumption, Section 20 of Act No. 33 does
not apply since a strict reading thereof would indicate it establishes review to the Horse
Racing Commission, the Dauphin County Common Pleas Court and the Pennsylvania
Superior Court only when a license, available for issuance, is not issued to. anyone,
thereby constituting "a license refused" (see Section 20, 15 § 2670). Under this interpretation, Act No. 331 is silent regarding an appeal from a grant of a license. This
Court's opinion at 438 in footnote 2 appears to have said, however, that a Section 20
appeal from a refusal may well follow this appeal, while the brief of Appellant indicates
such an appeal was denied. Brief for Appellant at 8, Man 0' War Racing Association v.
State Horse Racing Commission. Does the court's footnote indicate that Man 0' War can
appeal the case twice; once through Supreme Court certiorari for the grant of a license
and again through Section 20 for the refusal of a license? Can Man O'War merely change
the label on the appeal in order to facilitate this double appeal?
8. 405 Pa. 1, 173 A.2d 97 (1961).
9. Although Keystone states this rule of law, that court, at 7, found it unnecessary to
decide what is "judicial" since it dismissed the appeal on the ground that Appellant
lacked standing. The foundation of this rule of law comes from In Rimer's Contested
Election, 316 Pa. 342, 345-6, 175 A. 544 (1934), and Newport Township School District
v. State Tax Equalization Board, 366 Pa. 603, 79 A.2d 641 (1951).
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process which came to be called "judicial in nature."'1 This approach
may sound logical, but the problems develop when trying to decide in
a given case whether it is a decision of a "judicial" or "non-judicial"
nature. Although Mr. Justice Roberts conceded that the definition of
judicial was rather vague, he found a precise definition of judicial to
be unnecessary; finding the facts of the Man 0' War case clearly within
the broad definition of judicial. From a reading of Act No. 331, the
Court stated that the use of the word "judgment" as applied to the
Commission's determination" implied that the legislature intended
that the Commission's decisions be judicial in nature. The Court gained
further support from Section 20 of Act No. 33112 which gave the Horse
Racing Commission the power to administer oaths, examine witnesses,
issue subpoenas, compel witnesses to testify, and produce relevant
written material, all of which the Court felt are clearly functions of
judicial bodies.
In speaking of the Horse Racing Commission's decision to grant the
four licenses, this Court found additional support for the judicial
nature (and thereby the appealability of the decision) by looking at the
degree of public interest involved, citing Ritter Finance Co. of Levittown v. Myers.'3 Ritter, however, never discussed whether the lower
tribunal's decision was judicial in nature.' 4 Ritter had used public
interest as a factor in determining whether the appellant had standing
to bring the case before it. In Man 0' War, on the other hand, the
Court used the public interest analogy as support for the argument
that it was a case where an appeal would lie (using public interest as an
10. But see, 3 Davis § 24.02 at 391: "Nowhere can one find in modern opinions any
reason why certiorari should not lie to review non-judicial as well as judicial action.
The only purpose the classification serves is to perpetuate a system established centuries
ago for reasons that are no longer relevant."
11. This Court cites PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2657 (1968): "If in the judgment of
the State Horse Racing Commission. . . . it may grant such license.
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2670 (1968).
13. Ritter, supra n. 5.
we have not discussed or decided whether the act of
14. Ritter, supra at 476: "...
the Secretary of Banking . . . was judicial in nature, i.e., judicial or quasi-judicial."
Although this writer must have sympathy with this court in its attempt to separate the
discussion of appealability by certiorari and of Appellant's standing in the Ritter case,
a close reading of the cases cited in Ritter reveals that the public's interest has traditionally been used as a consideration in determining an Appellant's standing; not the
appealability by certiorari. The Ritter case at 470-76 shuffled Pennsylvania law regarding appeal by certiorari and standing of the parties into a state of confusion from
which subsequent Pennsylvania administrative law cases have yet to recover.
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element of judicial nature, itself a factor of appealability). It is reasonable to assume, however, that many of these subtle distinctions andtechnical differences traditionally used in finding appealability on the
one hand and standing on the other are not worthy of separation. It
seems only proper that the public interest factor involved in a given
case might well have relevance both to appealability by certiorari and
the appellant's standing to bring the case before the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. Therefore, the Court in Ritter and Man 0' War appear
justified in considering public interest in determining both judicial
nature (as related to appealability) as Man 0' War did, and in determining standing as did Ritter. It is submitted that the failure of Man
0' War is that it didn't spell this out. It insisted on trying to apply the
mechanical rules of the past instead of flatly stating that it was departing
from the game of technical and unrelated separation of considerations.
As a result of this failure, Pennsylvania law regarding appealability by
certiorari and standing from administrative decisions is left to flounder
between how Ritter and Man 0' War state precedence, and what the
precedence actually says. This confusion will exist until a clear statment
of the law is made and past cases in conflict are explicitly overruled
where necessary for clarity.
In continuing its discussion of whether the Commission's decision
was of a judicial nature, the Court considered the substantial nature
of the property rights involved in the Commission's determinations
as another way of finding the decision's judicial nature and thereby the
court's right to grant certiorari. This test has traditionally been one
applied most indiscriminately by the courts as a handy tool to avoid
hearing cases if such was their wish. 15 Mr. Justice Roberts, however,
minimizes the influence of this right versus privilege argument. Previous
Pennsylvania cases found property rights of a substantial nature to
exist only when property of an Appellant was created by previous
administrative decisions. 6 This Court looked at property rights in a
wider, more realistic view. In the instant case the Court recognized that
Man 0' War and the other applicants have, of necessity, spent much
money in the preparation of their applications for licenses 17 and in
15. Supra, Newport Township, n. 7 and this Court cites Tahiti Bar, Inc. Liquor
License Case, 395 Pa. 355, 150 A.2d 112 (1959).
16. L.e,, Where a license is up for revocation.
17. Including a $I,000 application fee.
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planning their tracks in order to convince the Horse Racing Commission of their earnestness and competence. In addition, the amount of
money at stake for the successful applicant and for the public through
tax revenue from the track operations is a type of property and clearly
of a substantial nature. The fact that the Court has granted certiorari
for the Appellant to appeal directly to the Supreme Court demonstrates
the Court's recognition of the great expense of leaving a situation such
as this in limbo for any substantial length of time. If in fact the test of
substantial property rights is a valid consideration in determining the
appealability of any given administrative decision,18 it is clear that this
Court's contribution to the test has been to make it far more credible.' 9
III.

MAN O' WAR'S STANDING

After determining that an appeal does lie on issues brought for
review by Appellant, the Court turned to the question of whether or
not Man 0' War Racing Association had standing to bring this case
before the Supreme Court.20 Citing the Keystone case, the Court stated
that for Man 0' War to have standing, a "direct interest in the subject
matter of the particular litigation" is necessary and that this interest
"must be immediate and pecuniary." 2 ' The Court in Keystone had said
that Appellant, an unsuccessful applicant, lacked standing to appeal
the grant of several licenses because there were still three licenses to be
issued. Justice Roberts dealt with Man 0' War as the logical extension
of Keystone. Here, Appellant was appealing the grant of licenses after
all of the licenses authorized had been issued. This Court's decision
on standing is made easier by Keystone's clear implication that if a
factual situation similar to Man 0' War ever occurred, standing would
lie.22 Another big factor making this Court's decision on standing easier
18.

But see; 3 Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 24.02 at 395 (1958).

19. See, Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) at 609: "calling a liquor
license a privilege does not free the municipal authorities from the due process requirements in licensing and allowing them to exercise on uncontrolled discretion."
20. The concept of standing, originating in common law, is quite alive today in U.S.
judicial restraint which requires a "case or controversy" between the parties before a
suit can be brought. Muskrat v. United States 219 U.S. 346 (1911). The purpose of
standing is to require the one bringing a case before a judicial body to have a strong
interest in the issues before the case, lest the court be bogged down with moot questions and collusive suits to obtain res judicata.
21. Keystone supra n5.
22.
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was that since the State Attorney General represented the Commission,
Man 0' War and similar aggrieved applicants were the only parties who

23
would ever raise an appeal.

IV.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

Having granted standing to Man 0' War, the Court turned to the
issues of procedural due process raised by Appellant. Mr. Justice
Roberts dismissed all of the due process issues raised except the claim of
the procedural right to cross examination at the administrative hearing.24 The extent of the Court's discussion of the right of cross examination was to say that it deserved consideration. At this point the Court
dealt with Appellee's claim that any procedural rights that Man 0' War
might have had were waived at the administrative level. The Court
agreed with Appellee's contention since Man 0' War received notice of
the proposed administrative procedure sufficient to allow ample opportunity for objections to be heard and alternatives suggested. 25 Although this decision foreclosed any further discussion by the Court of
procedural due process, Mr. Justice Roberts' mention of the possible
merit of Appellant's claim of cross examination leaves the door open
to many possibilities. Specifically, Man 0' War was urging that due
process required that they be given an opportunity to cross examine the
witnesses presented by the successful applicants, which would imply that
the cross examination would come after the granting of the licenses.
But, in addition, Man 0' War argued that their factual situation was
23. As an alternative to the moving party's individual interest, standing is also
granted when the public as a whole has an interest to be protected in the case at hand.
When standing is granted on this basis, the moving party serves as the representative of
the public's interest in the case; sort of a "private attorney general" (see F.C.C. v. Snaders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 60 S. Ct. 693, 84 L. Ed. 869 (1940) and 3 DAvis, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.05 (1958).
24. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Horse Racing Act itself on
grounds that there was: 1) No holding of comparative hearings of all applications prior
to the grant of the four licenses, 2) No opportunity to have witnesses under oath, to
cross-examine them, to offer evidence, and make arguments against an application, 3) No
opportunity to a hearing of all the evidence, and 4) No reasons set out by the Commission to back u.p its finding and give the Supreme Court something from which to
judge for abuse of discretion; Brief for Appellant at 9, Man 0' War v. State Horse
Racing Commission.
25. The undisputed facts indicate that at several points in the process of application,
applicants were encouraged to comment on the proposed procedure for consideration of
the applications. Appellant was silent on every such occasion.
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like that in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. F.C.C.26 since the licenses to be

granted in both cases were "mutually exclusive." 27 In Ashbacker, there
was one license available and two applicants, the loser of which had
no hearing until after the license was granted. The Supreme Court said
that this was a hollow right since the grant of all available licenses
makes the loser's appeal fruitless and therefore, the hearing must occur
before the licenses are granted. By stating that Man 0' War's cross
examination argument is worthy of consideration, is the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court implying that Man 0' War too might be a "mutually
exclusive" situation and that a full hearing with cross examination
should occur before the granting of any of the licenses?
V. ABUSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

Having disposed of the questions of procedural due process, the
Court discussed Appellant's contention that the Commission had
abused its discretion in granting the licenses. Justice Roberts contended
that abuse of discretion is grounds for overturning the administrative
decision only when it is a "clear abuse."' 28 In a discussion of the many
considerations made by the Commission in coming to its decision, the
Court made a strong case for the rational basis of the Commission's
decision. The Court could not overrule the Commission's finding
merely on the basis of bad judgment; a misapplication of the law or the
exercise of judgment that was "manifestly unreasonable and the result
of bad faith" 29 would have been necessary. Man 0' War presented much
evidence to shade possible doubt on the merit of the Commission's
judgment but fell far short of constituting bad faith or true abuse of
discretion.
CONCLUSION

The Court on the whole in Man 0' War seems to have handled the
issues in a very sophisticated manner, resisting the temptation to fall
26, 326 U.S. 327 (1954).
27. Id., at 333.

28. The Court cites as authority: Zeltner Liquor License Case, 174 Pa. Super. 98,
100 A.2d 132 (1954), and Zermani Liquor License Case, 173 Pa. Super. 428, 98 A.2d
645 (1953).

29.
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back on the many ancient inflexible rules used in handling administrative appeals. The Court appears to be attempting to establish law
that will be based on the reasoning behind the rule rather than just the
rule itself. The Court has succeeded in this attempt with its discussion
of the issue of standing. Instead of being bound by any strict rule for
the answer, it looked at the facts of the instant case and came up with
a clear and justifiable answer based on logical extension of the reasoning
in Keystone and a realistic look at the State Attorney General's inability
to serve the public interest. The Court also appears to have been
successful when it discussed the right versus privilege concept regarding the property rights at stake in this case. The Court rejected traditionally narrow views of property rights and flatly recognized the
obvious existence of valuable property rights in this case. The Court,
however, seemed to fall back on the application of the strict rule when
it came to its discussion of the public interest involved in Man 0' War.
Without even challenging the idea of whether the public interest element had been properly limited solely to consideration under appealability, the Court proceeded to use confused precedence to unwittingly
reaffirm the old rule limiting its use to appealability. However justified
the Man 0' War Court may have been in using public interest in its
particular discussion of appealability, it left more confusion regarding
future use of public interest by its slanting of the traditional rule of
public interest, as Ritter had also done, in order to make it appear that
it was applying the rule as it had always been. It is submitted that this
has resulted in the lack of predictibility for future cases with respect
to the scope and weight to be given the public interest consideration on
appeals from administrative decisions.
Robert S. Bailey
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